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1 Overview
• Particularly since the recent recession, the general public and policy makers have been
interested in aligning the incentives of executives with the incentives of shareholders.
• Embedding Total Shareholder Return (TSR) target metrics into top executive com-
pensation plans have been described as a simple and direct tool to align incentives.
• Despite the increased popularity of such TSR plans, the empirical evidence supporting
the expansion of this compensation strategy is limited.
• This brief aims to shed light on whether the inclusion of TSR measures in long-term
incentive plans result in improved firm performance.1
2 Data
The population of study for this research were identified using the 2014 S&P 500 index. A
rich longitudinal dataset was constructed using compensation data and firm financial data
covering fiscal years 2004 through 2013. Our analytical sample excluded 47 firms from this
population due to missing data concerns and another two firms as outliers.2 The information
regarding compensation was derived from Equilar’s executive compensation data. These data
contain detailed records of the compensation types and amounts for named executive officers
from firms in our sample. For example, we observe base salary, bonus payouts, stock awards,
option awards, and several types of incentive plan awards. Measures of firm performance
include 1, 3 and 5-year TSR as well as annual measures of return on equity (ROE), earning
per share (EPS) growth, and total revenue growth. Firm performance measures came from
1This brief is meant only to summarize the analytical research conducted to date. A full-length academic
working paper is forthcoming.
2These two outliers were classified as such because they had firm performance measures outside of the
reasonable range of values, suggesting data error. The trimming parameters were set to flag observations
where total revenue growth exceeded 100 percent, 1/3/5 TSR was above 5, or ROE was not between negative




To examine how the inclusion of TSR plans impact firm performance, we used both de-
scriptive analysis and also regression analysis. The descriptive analysis compared the raw
patterns among groups of firms with and without TSR plans over time. The resulting tables
and figures are valuable in understanding the unconditional relationship between TSR plans
and firm performance. All analysis was conducted on three subsamples of executives: top
five named executive officers (NEOs), CEOs only, and top five NEOs excluding CEOs.
Regression analysis was used to as a way to control for other factors related to the role of
TSR measures on firm performance. Our baseline model uses the following Ordinary Least
Squares regression framework:
Yit = β1 + Zitβ2 + Sitβ3 + Ctβ4 + β5Xit + β6Xi,t−1 + β7Xi,t−2 + it (1)
Yit represents a given performance measure for firm i in fiscal year t. The set of firm
performance measures studied in this brief are 1-year TSR, 3-year TSR, 5-year TSR, ROE,
EPS growth, and total revenue growth. Zit is a set of control variables including functions of
market capitalization and an indicator for change in CEO. Our model also accounts for sector
performance and year fixed effects with Sit and Ct, respectively. The key variables in this
project capture the existence and weight of TSR measures in the top executive compensation
plans, represented by Xit. For the existence of a TSR plan, Xit, is an indicator variable equal
to one when a firm has any executive in the relative sample with a TSR plan during the
current fiscal year. To analyze the role of weight on performance, Xit is set to the firm-
level average of the ratio of TSR award to either long term incentives (LTI) or total direct
3We would like to thank Pearl Meyer & Partners for providing us with the data used in this brief and also
for constructing the key measures of TSR plan existence, TSR plan awards, performance-based compensation,
long-term incentive pay, total compensation, and others.
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compensation (TDC).4 Our baseline model includes two lags of Xit. Finally, the remaining
error in the model is captured by it, which is clustered at the firm level.
Multiple extensions of the baseline model were investigated to assess the sensitivity of our
findings. One extension replaced the sector fixed effects with firm effects, which allows the
model to control for unobserved firm-specific and fixed attributes.5 We also partitioned the
sample by firm size and by TSR plan history. Additional sensitivity checks include removing
the Financials sector from the analysis and running models with a richer set of lag measures.
4 Results
Descriptive Statistics
• Table 1 shows that for all three groups (Top 5, CEOs, and Top 5 Excluding CEOs)
the share of firms with TSR plans has increased from roughly 16 percent of firms to
just under 50 percent of firms.
• Table 2 reports how the weight of TSR has changed over time. The increasing pat-
terns in the unconditional columns and decreasing patterns in the conditional columns
suggests that more executives are receiving TSR measures in their compensation plans
but that the relative weight of those TSR plans is decreasing.
• Table 3 confirms the findings from Table 2 by demonstrating that the growth in the
weight of performance-based grants is a result of growth in non-TSR components.
• Tables 4 through 6 show that firms in all sectors have increasingly included TSR plans
in the compensation of their executives.
• Table 7 groups firms by whether they always had a TSR plan, never had a TSR plan, or
changed. This grouping indicates that the firms that change are larger while upholding
4See Appendix for variable definitions.
5For a thorough explanation of fixed effects techniques see Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. Econometric analysis
of cross section and panel data. MIT press, 2010.
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the previous finding that those with TSR plans tend to be less profitable.
Regression Analysis
• Estimates of TSR plans on firm performance (Tables 8 through 10) indicate that there is
no strong evidence of a positive impact of TSR plans on firm performance. Moreover,
we find that point estimates of TSR plans on 1/3/5 year TSR measures are often
negative while only occasionally being statistically significant.
• For example, the right panel of Table 10 reports the estimates of the role of TSR plans
on total revenue growth.
– The estimates of the first lag of TSR plan on revenue growth, i.e., how is the
existence of a TSR plan among any of the company’s NEOs one year ago related
to current revenue growth, are negative.
– Column 5 indicates that the existence of a TSR plan one year ago is associated
with a decline in current revenue growth by 2.2 percentage points.
• Moreover, further analyses find a consistent pattern of a negative relationship between
TSR plans and total revenue growth, where the one year lag appears to be the driving
factor.
• Estimates of relative TSR to LTI on firm performance (Tables 11 through 13) continue
to present evidence of a negative relationship between TSR measures and total revenue
growth.
– Models incorporating firm fixed effects find small but statistically significant pos-
itive estimates of the role of contemporaneous TSR weights on ROE
– Specifically, a one percent increase in the ratio of TSR to LTI is associated with
a 0.1 percent increase in ROE.
5
• Additional analyses examined the sensitivity of the above regression estimates by quar-
tile of market capitalization, exclusion of the Financials sector, exclusion of firms with-
out changing TSR policies, richer five year lagged dependent variable structure, and
limiting the analysis to only those firms with relative TSR to LTI greater than 50
percent.6
5 Discussion and Future Direction
Currently, almost half of the 2014 S&P 500 firms offer TSR plans to their named executive
officers (NEO) - a twofold increase between 2004 and 2013. As evidenced by Table 2, the
increase in the weight of TSR awards to both LTI and TDC appears to be the result of
more NEOs receiving low weighted TSR plans. Furthermore, increases in the weight of
performance-based pay to both LTI and TDC over time are related to the increases in both
the frequency and weight of performance-based grants over time. The expansion of TSR
plans is observed across all sectors, with particularly large uptake within the Consumer
Staples and Information Technology sectors.
Differences are observable in the firms that include TSR measures into the compensation
plans of their executives compared to those that do not include TSR plans. Firms with TSR
plans tend to be larger (as measured by market capitalization and total revenue) and less
profitable (as measured by 10 year compound annual growth rates (CAGR) of Net Income,
ROIC, EBIT, EPS, ROA, ROE, and Free Cash Flow). The evidence from our primary model
specifications as well as numerous sensitivity checks indicate that there is either no impact
of TSR plans on firm performance or weak evidence of a negative relationship.
An important caution of these results needs to be noted. As with any regression models
of the type deployed here, statistical results only indicate relationship, not causation. That
said, the models controlled for a wide range of likely influential factors, including firm size,
sector, change in CEO leadership, time effects, and firm-specific fixed effects.
6The results of these analyses are available from the authors upon request.
6
The academic literature around TSR awards and firm performance is very limited. This
project represents the first academic effort to address this topic. The importance of this work
is not only to clarify the trends associated with expanding TSR plans for executives of S&P
500 companies, but to surface the need for further empirical research on the relationship
between including TSR and other metrics of firm performance in the compensation plans of
top executives and the ultimate sustainable financial success for the firms they lead. The
future steps in this line of research could examine, for example, more refined measures of




This appendix provides variable definitions for key measures used in this study.
• TSR outcome measures, where the closing price is adjusted for dividends
– 1-Year TSR: (Fiscal year end stock price/previous fiscal year end stock price)-1
– 3-Year TSR: {(Fiscal year end stock price/three fiscal year priors end stock
price)(ˆ1/3)}-1
– 5-Year TSR: {(Fiscal year end stock price/five fiscal year priors end stock price)(ˆ1/5)}-
1
• TDC measures
– For FY 2006-2013: TDC = Long-Term Incentives + Base Salary + Short-Term
Portion of NEIP Compensation + Bonus
– For FY 2004-2005: TDC = Base Salary + Bonus + Other Annual Compensation
+ Restricted Stock + Value of Stock Options (FAS 123(R)) + LTIP Payouts +
Other Compensation
• LTI measures
– For FY 2006-2013: LTI = Grant Date Present Value of Securities + Grant Date
Present Value of Option (FAS 123(R)) + Grant Date Present Value of Target
Award
– For FY 2004-2005: LTI = Restricted Stock Awards + Grant Date Present Value
of Option (FAS 123(R)) + FYE Target Value
8
7 Tables
Table 1: Percent of Firms with TSR
Plans
Top 5 CEO Top 5
Excluding CEO
2004 16.57 16.06 15.75
2005 13.71 12.9 13.48
2006 20.8 20.63 20.35
2007 24.34 22.79 23.68
2008 24.78 24.1 24.33
2009 26.54 25.78 26.1
2010 30.43 29.89 30.22
2011 32.62 31.82 31.97
2012 44.16 42.83 43.31
2013 48.25 47.12 46.82
Means of the share of firms with TSR plans
by three samples: top 5 NEOs, CEOs, and
top 5 NEOs excluding CEOs.
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